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SO:  Before 1994, what was your opinion of the Commonwealth? How much 
did you feel that re-entry into the Commonwealth would be valuable for 
South Africa?  
 
RB:  Not much. In my thinking, the Commonwealth had come to naught. But at 
least they approached us in 1985, after the Rubicon speech. And they arrived 
here early in 1986, soon after I made that remark at a press conference that 
the country would have a black president. And I was roasted in Parliament – 
with those galleries packed with women in their smart dresses and their hats 
and the President humiliating me. It was the best investment I ever made, that 
remark. 
 
SO:  At the time, General Obasanjo and his colleagues – upon coming to 
South Africa – also knew what a rough ride you’d had?  
 
RB:  Yes, they did. The newspapers until July-August 1986 were full of that 
remark. And now, here the EPG come. It was an extremely difficult task for 
me. I had, at first, decided to resign, and to create my own party which would 
have been called the National Democratic Party (NDP). For that I received 
commitments – indications from well-known South African enterprises running 
into alluring amounts. My office received over 1000 calls, telegrams, and 
messages from the public: “Please don’t go. Hang in there.” From English, 
Afrikaners, Indians, blacks, coloureds, the lot. I asked PW Botha’s private 
secretary how many responses PW Botha had got – three! Three messages, 
congratulating him. However, some Cabinet colleagues wanted me out. But 
not PW. Before we had that clash which forced him to resign in August 1989, 
he called me into his office one day, where there was a golden seal which is 
handed over from one president to the other in an elegant wood display 
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stand. He said he wanted so much to hand this over to De Klerk, but he 
couldn’t do it. De Klerk could come and take it, one day, if he became the 
President of our country. He said, “I feel I owe something to you. I must tell 
you that one of the most painful decisions I ever had to take was the day I 
had to reprimand you in Parliament. It was not my choice, it came from two of 
your cabinet colleagues.” They had told him the Cabinet would split if he 
didn’t do it. 
 
SO:  Please could you fill in some background on South African attitudes to 
the EPG visit?  
 
RB:  The first reaction here – when the news of the decision at Nassau [arrived] – 
was negative: “They [are] not welcome here. They [are] an ill-assorted 
organisation”; “Useless Commonwealth, they kicked us out in 1961!” When a 
mission was raised of an Eminent Persons Group coming to South Africa, Mrs 
Thatcher wrote a letter and I drafted the reply for PW Botha, putting in 
conditions implying as long as they don’t interfere in South Africa’s internal 
affairs – aspects of that nature – and to give everyone a fair chance to be 
heard, we agreed. And he signed it. That did it.1  
 
All PW Botha’s letters to Thatcher were drafted by my Department. PW had 
great respect for Thatcher. Of all the leaders over the world, she was the one 
whom he felt was not in favour of crushing the National Party, leading to 
uncontrollable violence with serious consequences for Blacks and Whites. He 
believed that she appreciated – and knew – that this could also have a very 
negative effect for British investors. 
 
SO:  So, if it wasn’t for her support, the EPG wouldn’t have got through the 
door? This is the irony – as, to the Commonwealth, she was the villain 
of the piece.  
 
RB:  I can assure you, when I went to PW Botha I said, “We can’t slap Margaret 
Thatcher in the face.” She persuaded us to allow the EPG. If it was not for 
that lady, we would never have allowed the EPG. We would have turned 
round and said we have had enough of international intervention in our 
internal affairs. Good bye. 
 
SO:  At the CHOGM Nassau meeting in 1985, the story is that “she was in the 
way.” The Anti-Apartheid Movement’s view was that she was the 
problem.  However, at a Witness Seminar on Britain and South Africa I 
organised in January 2009 [with LSE IDEAS and the Centre for 
Contemporary British History], her former Private Secretary, Jonathan 
Powell, said, “Look, governments talk to governments. That’s what 
governments do” – implying that the AAM was actually a very useful 
safety valve for Mrs Thatcher, such as its demonstrations in Hyde Park 
when PW Botha visited Thatcher at Chequers in June 1984. She could 
                                                          
1
 Cf. Documents in the Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive [www.margaretthatcher.org]:  
M Thatcher to PW Botha, undated [Oct 1985], 22B0B6BA712A4A0B81430DB11991FBD9;  
M Thatcher to PW Botha, 31 Oct 1985, 6D1A4F11C9AD4BD58A3493B01077D862;  
PW Botha to M Thatcher, 12 Nov 1985, D9C7C22942454B03BFCAB95F679292C9;  
M Thatcher to PW Botha, 17 Nov 1985,  806E0C7AA6CA4857B57A0D41107726A5;  
M Thatcher to PW Botha, 14 Dec 1985, 8D5A66B1A8B14D68AE14B170F735D12C;  
M Thatcher to PW Botha, 8 Jan 1986, 0555750999F148E88758BB19C54B6768;  
M Thatcher to PW Botha, undated [1986] F2B2DEB1CFD540248D5FF5012F0186B9. 
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turn round to PW Botha and say, “Look, I have to manage this domestic 
constituency.” As part of her message to encourage change in South 
Africa, she was saying “This really matters to people here.” 
 
RB: There are two leaders who played a significant role in getting apartheid 
removed peacefully: Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. The others 
made it more difficult for us. Every time I was trying to further the repeal of 
some act embodying apartheid, the opposition I had to deal with within the 
National Party reproachfully reacted as a result of the negative [attention] 
internationally, saying, “Pik Botha, despite repealing the legislation, the UNO 
[has] passed a worse condemnatory Resolution.” These were the two leaders 
who were nonetheless impressed by what the rest of the world considered 
face-saving minor changes. And they made it clear that they were opposed to 
violence as the force of change in South Africa. It should be free and fair 
democratic elections. I was pointing out to our caucus that we cannot insult 
these two. We cannot insult Margaret Thatcher. She is opposed to severe 
economic sanctions. I used this as a bargaining chip, a crowbar, in order to 
move faster towards dismantling apartheid. History owes them a debt, and 
recognition. It was Thatcher’s views – she strongly rejected apartheid and 
urged us to release Mandela. But she also told the ANC, “I am not going to 
support negotiation if you continue to resort to violence as a means of 
achieving your objective.” 
 
SO:  So PW Botha was concerned that, if the EPG was allowed to come, 
they’d be used as an internal lobbying group? When you say that the 
Eminent Persons Group played a historic role without really knowing it, 
what do you mean by that?  
 
RB:  The EPG came closer to success than most people realise. They had 
numerous meetings with Government members. They met with Mr Mandela 
three times in the Pollsmoor prison. They reported extensively on Mr 
Mandela’s views. In their report, the EPG said they were forcibly struck by the 
overwhelming desire in South Africa for a non-violent negotiated settlement. 
On 13 March 1986, the EPG transmitted their ‘Possible Negotiating Concept’ 
[document] to us. I knew that Mr Mandela personally was prepared to accept 
the Negotiating Concept on the understanding that his colleagues in the ANC 
be consulted in order to obtain their acceptance as well. 
 
The ‘Negotiating Concept’ was a prophetic document. It embodied all the 
elements which formed the basis of the negotiations between the South 
African Government and the ANC four years later. Those negotiations led to 
the new era in South Africa’s history. For that reason, I will be grateful if you 
can reproduce in full:  
 
[Reproduced from RF Botha, ‘His South African Connection’, in Hans d’Orville 
(ed.), Leadership for Africa: In Honor of Olusegun Obsanjo on the Occasion 
of his 60th Birthday (New York, 1995), pp.55-70, p.66] 
 
“The South African Government has declared its commitment to dismantling 
the system of apartheid, to ending racial discrimination and to broad-based 
negotiations leading to new constitutional arrangements for power-sharing by 
all the people of South Africa. In the light of preliminary and as yet incomplete 
discussions with representatives of various organisations and groups, within 
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and outside South Africa, we believe that in the context of specific and 
meaningful steps being taken towards ending apartheid, the following 
additional action might ensure negotiations and a break in the cycle of 
violence. 
 
“On the part of the Government: 
a) Removal of the military from the townships, providing for freedom 
of assembly and discussion and suspension of detention without 
trial. 
b) The release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and 
detainees. 
c) The unbanning of the ANC and PAC and the permitting of normal 
political activity. 
 
“On the part of the ANC and others: 
  Entering negotiations and suspending violence. 
 
“It is our view that simultaneous announcements incorporating these ideas 
might be negotiated if the Government were to be interested in pursuing this 
broad approach. 
 
“In the light of the Government’s indication to us that it: 
1) is not in principle against the release of Nelson Mandela and 
similar prisoners;  
2) is not opposed in principle to the unbanning of any organisation; 
3) is prepared to enter into negotiations with the acknowledged 
leaders of the people of South Africa; 
4) is committed to the removal of discrimination, not only from the 
statute books but also  from South African society as a whole; 
5) is committed to the ending of white domination;  
6) will not prescribe who may represent black communities in 
negotiations on a new constitution for South Africa; 
7) is prepared to negotiate on an open agenda. 
 
The South African Government may wish to give serious consideration to the 
approach outlined in this note.” 
 
The ‘Negotiating Concept’ was a balanced document, couched in inoffensive 
language, inviting the two opposing forces to start talking and to stop fighting 
about the country’s future. General Obasanjo’s hand was all over the 
document. 
 
I drafted the postscript points (1) to (7). I was deeply satisfied that it was used 
prominently in the Concept. Eyebrows were lifted on our side but I was not 
shot down.  
 
Our discussions with the EPG floundered on the issue as to whether the ANC 
should merely ‘suspend’ violence or instead ‘terminate’ it. There were also a 
few other questions of concern to us, but the main problem was that if 
‘suspending’ violence meant only discontinuing violence for as long as 
negotiations continued, then the threat of a resumption of violence would 
become a bargaining counter. In other words: “Keep talking… or else.” 
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Significantly, this same issue again formed the major stumbling block in 
getting the negotiations going four years later. It was eventually resolved at 
the end of 1990. The irony is that, today, few South Africans would even know 
what the fuss was about. In such a way it is that history moves us past some 
of our most earnest issues.  
 
But the real trigger was our Air Force. The very day that General Obasanjo 
was going to hand to me – on 19 May 1986 – their final Possible Negotiating 
Concept, the Director General of my department, Neil Van Heerden, phoned 
me at about 5.00-6.00 AM to say that he had been phoned about an hour 
earlier by a senior officer to say they were already on their way to bomb 
Harare, Gaborone and Lusaka against ANC targets. Unfortunately, that 
capsized the boat. 
 
SO:  You had no inkling whatsoever of these attacks? 
 
RB:  They kept it from us. To this day, I have a suspicion that they cleared it with 
PW Botha and that he was beginning to become concerned about the EPG 
and their proposals. On 19 May 1986, I formally responded to the EPG’s 
Negotiating Concept in a letter to General Obasanjo and Mr Fraser. It was the 
culmination of intense debate and argumentation amongst my colleagues and 
myself. It was the best I could do. I expressed the Government’s concerns on 
the issue of violence and three other points but ended by saying: “The South 
African Government would welcome further discussions which could 
accommodate the Government’s concerns. I would like to thank you and your 
colleagues for the spirit in which we have been able to conduct our 
discussions.” 
 
I should have added a postscript: “My particular thanks to Olusegun 
Obasanjo.” 
 
On 5 June 1986, the Co-Chairman responded. They did not agree with the 
South African Government’s points of concern and reiterated their belief that 
the Negotiating Concept would assist in achieving negotiations in a nonviolent 
atmosphere.  
 
General Obasanjo was only too aware of the disastrous consequences of 
misconceptions and notional preconceptions. He warned that they should not 
be underestimated. Instead, they needed to be removed. The mind-sets of 
both black and white had to be changed. Both had come to realise that only 
one country, South Africa, would have to be shared for both to survive and 
live in peace.  
 
He remained optimistic for success in South Africa. “I have confidence in the 
inevitability of victory… and believe that we can bring it about without 
revenge, recrimination and bitterness,” he once said.  
 
The fateful critical divergence of views between the South African 
Government and the ANC on the issue of ‘terminating’ or ‘suspending’ 
violence in 1986 is a classic illustration of an innate human trait which has 
been haunting humanity for centuries. I call it the ‘revocability fear’.  
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The ANC suspected that the Government’s design to get them to agree to the 
termination of all violence on their part was to gain time to consolidate its 
position, internally and externally. The Government could then enter into 
protracted negotiations – producing proposals which might seem reasonable 
and acceptable to the outside world but which would rob the ANC of a strong 
bargaining counter in extracting concessions from the Government. In short, 
the ANC believed that the Government would not voluntarily relinquish power, 
come what may. 
 
The Government, in turn, believed that the ANC’s willingness to ‘suspend’ 
violence was their strategy to get the talks going – with total world support – 
and then to make demands under the threat of a resumption of violence if 
their demands were not met. They would then exploit anti-apartheid world 
opinion to support their resumption of violence.  
 
What I had in mind in making my ultimate appeal on 19 May 1986 to the EPG 
for further discussions on the issue of violence was to explore the feasibility of 
an international or Commonwealth guarantee or pledge, to the effect that the 
international community would expect both parties to implement their 
commitments in good faith and would monitor the process. I drafted the 
postscript points (1) to (7), which required Cabinet approval. And it was not 
easy to get approval. 
 
SO:  Who were your greatest opponents in getting approval? 
 
RB:  Well, the President was hesitant, and some ministers. 
 
SO:  Chris Heunis? 
 
RB:  Not so much Chris. It didn’t appeal to him that I played such a central role in 
the EPG discussions as, strictly speaking, he was the responsible minister for 
internal constitutional affairs. So, perhaps he felt I was overstepping the 
margin. Perhaps I did.  
 
SO:  You had a considerable number of informal discussions with the EPG, 
and with its leaders. 
 
RB:  You mustn’t forget the visit of the EC three – one was the Italian, who was a 
great friend of mine. It is mentioned here… 
 
SO:  The EC? When Geoffrey Howe came to represent the EC? 
 
RB:  No, he was not part of that. It was the European Community who sent a 
delegation of three: the one who had the presidency chair for the previous 
year, the current one and the next year. And already, then, we started to 
formulate some important points of departure. 
 
“It is the conviction of the Government that any future constitutional 
dispensation providing for participation by all South African citizens should be 
the result of negotiations with the leaders of all communities.” Not just those 
whom we select. “The Government will not prescribe who may represent 
black communities in negotiations on a new constitution for South Africa. The 
only condition is that those who participate in negotiations should foreswear 
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violence…” – that is the key – “…as the means of achieving political 
objectives”. [Cited from RF Botha, ‘His South African Connection’, in Hans 
d’Orville (ed.), Leadership for Africa: In Honor of Olusegun Obsanjo on the 
Occasion of his 60th Birthday (New York, 1995), pp.55-70, p.60] 
 
We used that in 1985. When I drafted [this] for PW Botha [for] his opening of 
Parliament statement, it was not part of the printed version when he pulled it 
out of his pocket and read it – that we would release Mandela if he would 
abandon violence as a means of achieving political objectives. 
 
SO:  Sir, had you drafted this before the arrival of the EPG? 
 
RB: No, no. It was while they were here. You will see, here, [referring to the article 
in Hans d’Orville’s Leadership for Africa edited volume, cited above] the EPG 
was at first not happy with our first reactions. Those points did not appeal to 
the EPG. For them, it was too vague. They came back to us, and you will see, 
here, how they deal with this. After they had showed their dissatisfaction with 
our discussions on what they regarded as rather vague – those that I quoted 
here – I then… here are the basic seven points which they accepted.  
 
[Botha’s article quotes the EPG’s reaction as stating that: “The South African 
Government’s position defies succinct summary. It has perfected a 
specialised political vocabulary which, while saying one thing, means quite 
another. Thus the states approach to negotiations was qualified by a number 
of provisos, which were repeatedly underlined in the course of our 
discussions. While apartheid was declared ‘outmoded’, ‘finished’ and, indeed 
‘dead’, the Government’s objective was the exercise of political rights and 
freedoms within the structures of ‘groups’ or ‘communities’. South Africa was 
a nation of minorities and future constitutional arrangements would give 
expression to individual aspirations only within the confines of their ethnic 
groups. Group rights were to take precedence over individual rights, with 
built-in assurances of no one group being dominated by others. Western 
democratic practice had no relevance to South African conditions.” See RF 
Botha, ‘His South African Connection’, in Hans d’Orville (ed.), Leadership for 
Africa: In Honor of Olusegun Obsanjo on the Occasion of his 60th Birthday 
(New York, 1995), pp.55-70, p.61]. 
 
SO:  When you had meetings with the EPG, did you have meetings with these 
‘Seven Wise Men’ as a unit, or did you have individual meetings with 
General Obasanjo? 
 
RB: When General Obasanjo and Malcolm Fraser, who were co-Chairmen, 
landed here, I did not – as is normal practice – meet them at the international 
airport. I arranged for a VIP military helicopter to take Obasanjo on a trip 
around the Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging industrial complex. That is the 
present Gauteng, the economic heart of South Africa. That flight took almost 
an hour, so you can imagine it was quite a distance. Then, they landed at the 
Waterkloof military airbase, and there I met him. He came out and we greeted 
each other. I asked, “How are you?” and he said, “I am shocked.” Those were 
his words: “I am shocked.” “For a moment, I did not know what was going on,” 
he went on. “I did not know that there exists a place like that on the African 
continent.” That was Obasanjo’s reaction. He said, “I have never seen 
anywhere in Africa what I have seen here. And that is so precious. It has got 
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to be preserved.” So, that indicates to you there was a special relationship 
between the two of us. So, we often met, just the two of us. Fraser was more 
difficult. I never met with him alone. I only met with Obasanjo alone. 
 
SO:  In what ways was Fraser more difficult? 
 
RB:  You must study his history, and then you will see. Even the Australians kicked 
him out. I don’t want to go into that, it might sound like personal insults. 
 
SO:  But personal chemistry is important in this type of top-level 
negotiation? 
 
RB:    Obasanjo is an African, and I am an African. We are both Africans. Fraser 
was an international figure from outside. And, of course, he was against 
apartheid – but that does not mean that Obasanjo was for apartheid. But, 
Obasanjo had a far greater appreciation of our history, of the history of the 
Afrikaner, of the Great Trek. He said that the Afrikaner is an inherent part of 
Africa. Other Africans should acknowledge this to a greater extent, and, by 
doing so, diminish the Afrikaner’s fear of being overwhelmed. 
 
SO:  So you shared unspoken assumptions, given your African view points 
of the world, which you did not share with others from outside the 
continent? 
 
RB:  If you are not from Africa – if you are outside, and haven’t lived here, [haven’t] 
gone through wars here, and histories? We participated in WWI. We took 
Namibia from the Germans. In WWII, we virtually chased out the Italians, then 
went to fight the Germans in the North, in El Alamein. In the concentration 
camps of the Anglo-South African war, 34,000 women and children died: ten 
per cent of the Boer population of Paul Kruger’s Republic and the Orange 
Free State. In today’s South Africa, that would mean – in terms of the present 
population – that five million South Africans would die. That was part of our 
history. And people like Obasanjo knew this. He had a sympathy for it. As did 
people like Houpouet Boigny of Ivory Coast, like Arap Moi, like Kenneth 
Kaunda, like Samora Machel, Senghor. I could visit them anytime. They 
would receive me. 
 
SO:  Did you feel the same sense of connection with John Malecela, the 
Tanzanian representative on the EPG? 
 
RB:  By then, I had learned a little bit about how international conferences come to 
naught and why. It is often because the gatherings are simply too large.  
 
SO:  So, was that also true of the dynamic of your discussions with the EPG? 
‘Seven Wise Men’ was still too large a group? 
 
RB:  I immediately found in Obasanjo a fellow African who had an understanding 
for the history of the Afrikaner. And the others did not. 
 
SO:  What about Anthony Barber? Did you feel the same sense of affinity 
with him? 
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RB:  No. He wasn’t as senior. Obasanjo was a fellow chairman. Decisions must be 
taken. And I have learned in life who is taking the decisions. 
 
SO:  So you concentrate on the top? 
 
RB:  Yes. And we became – and we remained – friends. What later happened was 
[that] he was arrested by Abacha. Obasanjo’s wife, who later died, had a bag 
with a false bottom in which she could take letters to him, and take letters out. 
The rest of the bag was filled with tinned food and drinks. In this way, a chief 
– and this was already after 1994, when I had just become Minister of Mineral 
and Energy Affairs – came to present a letter from Obasanjo in prison. The 
letter implied that he might be killed in prison. But while I was still Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Abacha sent a delegation to me – a big one, 8 or 9…it cost us 
a lot to accommodate them properly – asking me to get in touch with the 
Americans and the British. I phoned Douglas Hurd, whom I regarded as a 
friend – he had a home in the rural areas, and I [had] spent an entire day 
there; it was that sort of relationship. And Abacha said the US and GB were 
forcing severe sanctions against Nigeria. They couldn’t go anywhere. They 
pleaded with me to try and talk to the Americans and British, at least to lift 
some of the travel restrictions on them. I don’t know to whom I spoke in 
America, but in Britain it was Douglas. His first reaction was, “Pik, don’t tell 
me you have now become an advocate for that scoundrel!” I said, “No, 
Douglas. First of all, I agree, he is a scoundrel, but I think I have a better 
knowledge of the effect of sanctions than you have.” “What do you mean?” 
[he replied,] not unfriendly, or nasty. “Because we were victims of sanctions, 
and eventually it is not the decision-makers who pay the price. It is the 
normal, ordinary people. The decision-makers keep driving in their smart 
cars, and living their highfalutin type of life. It is the same here. Your 
sanctions have no effect on Abacha and his Cabinet, and those who are 
kerbed by sanctions. He lives lavishly, but the Nigerians suffer; they pay the 
price, because certain economic progress cannot get off the ground. Whether 
you like it or not, there are certain programmes in Nigeria which require 
European and American assistance, know-how and capital.” Douglas was 
sympathetic and said, “Leave it to me.” He would talk to the Americans and 
see if there could be some relief. 
 
Abacha’s delegation was quite pleased. They returned to Nigeria and a little 
later they arrested Obasanjo. The chief – well known in Nigeria, a lean and 
tall man – came to see me with the letter smuggled from Obasanjo in prison, 
as I said earlier. The headman also told me Obasanjo’s wife had told him 
Abacha was going to apply a deceitful action, namely to pretend Obasanjo 
had got flu and that he needed an injection, and then kill him. Obasanjo 
himself told me later – after his release – that they made several attempts to 
give him injections, which he refused every time. He feared the day that he 
would be held down forcibly on the bed and given an injection. This is not 
known, and it sounds like a fantasy story. This is what happened. There is the 
evidence… 
 
[RB points to a lengthy, handwritten dedication to ‘My good brother and friend 
Pik’ in a copy of Hans d’Orville (ed.), Leadership for Africa: In Honor of 
Olusegun Obasanjo on the occasion of His 60th Birthday (New York, 1995. 
The dedication reads: “With profound respect for working with us at a most 
crucial time in the history of South Africa to achieve the watershed and 
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wishing you the best of luck, health and success in every endeavour. It is 
great joy for me that South Africa is succeeding in solving its political 
problems. I wish every one of our brothers and sisters peace, joy, satisfaction, 
contentment and prosperity. It is always a great delight to be here in South 
Africa which is almost a second home to me. Please accept my special 
gratitude for efforts to secure my release from prison.”] 
 
SO:  What efforts did you make? 
 
RB:  I then contacted Abacha via the Nigerian representative in Gaborone, as they 
did not have one here. I made contact. It was a High Commissioner. “You 
send a message to Abacha, that if he killed Obasanjo, I will make it my life’s 
foremost and lasting ideal to destroy him. Send that message.” Despite the 
fact that Douglas Hurd felt that I was off track, nevertheless, I did it. I put into 
jeopardy my relationship with Douglas Hurd. Of course I have no evidence 
that this saved Obasanjo’s life, but he wasn’t killed. That is the real meaning 
of those words. We discussed it again when he came here to South Africa in 
1998, when I was no more a Minister in Mandela’s cabinet since 1996. We 
met there in the old Governor General’s office, which is now an international 
conference centre. He embraced me with tears when he signed the book for 
me, on 16th July. 
 
SO:  Sir, you are setting out a remarkable political friendship, a personal 
friendship. 
 
RB:  Now, we are back at the EPG. And read those seven points. They are the key 
points, Sue. The EPG told Minister Heunis and myself at a meeting on 12 
March 1986 that, if the SAG saw no merit in their proposals, little purpose 
would be served by taking them to other relevant parties and outside South 
Africa. Although the efforts of the EPG did not succeed, the Negotiating 
Concept was a prophetic document. It embodied all the elements which 
formed the basis of negotiations between the South African Government and 
the ANC four years later. Those negotiations led to the new era in South 
Africa’s history. 
 
SO:  Sir, can I just suggest to you that the arrival of the EPG was to your 
advantage in the pursuit of reform? 
 
RB:  For sure! No question about it. It was of remarkable significance. These were 
the basic points of our first meeting with the ANC, four years later. I don’t 
know why historians haven’t picked it up. I don’t understand it! 
 
SO:  I think because they had convinced themselves so much that the South 
African Government – as they conceived it – was so rigidly against 
reform and negotiation. I am not saying this is true, Sir. I am talking 
about perceptions outside South Africa that take time to dissipate. 
 
RB:  But, I repeat to you, there it is. In 1986; not 1990. 
 
SO:  So, was this a missed opportunity, then, in 1986, to accelerate reform? 
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RB: No, and yes. If this was accepted – if we could reach agreement on 
‘termination’ and not ‘suspension’ of violence – then negotiations might have 
started earlier, but the war in Angola would have remained a stumbling block.  
 
SO:  Sir, you also assisted in the EPG meeting Mandela, because the Minister 
of Justice was much more resistant to this idea. 
 
RB:  Of course he was. He turned down virtually every request from prominent 
outsiders to visit Mandela.  
 
SO:  How did you do that? 
 
RB:  I went to PW. I said to him, “You can forget about any further positive results 
from the EPG if we don’t [do] this. They are here as a result of Margaret 
Thatcher’s intervention.” I used her name.  
 
SO:  Was that a powerful card to play with PW Botha? 
 
RB:  Oh yes, all along, all the time. I did so often – even with the Coventry Four. 
Yes, there were one or two terse reactions from the British Government’s 
side, but it didn’t derail anything. Not at all. You look at the judgement that 
day, and the terms on which the bail was forfeited, etc. From Britain’s side, 
the British officials said to me, “You’ve got us over a barrel.” Because the 
British Consul transgressed in terms of international law in allowing these 
people to enter the Consulate. That was, strictly speaking, against 
international law. And, in terms of international law, a country like South Africa 
could take reprisals. 
 
SO:  They [i.e. South African anti-apartheid activists] were claiming 
diplomatic immunity by trying to enter the [British] Consulate in Durban. 
[Referring to events in August 1984]. 
 
RB:  But you can’t ask for refuge in your Consulate in South Africa. A British 
subject cannot take refuge in a foreign embassy in London if he intended to 
blow up your House of Commons. The British Government is entitled to arrest 
those British citizens who are suspected of planning violence. The Embassy 
or Consulate can accommodate a refugee with no criminal record whatsoever 
who, for purely political reasons, fear prosecution. There, amnesty comes into 
it. But not in the case of suspects who intend to commit the violent overthrow 
of a government. 
 
SO:  Sir, please can I just present how it was seen by the other side? You are 
setting out the contribution of a dialogue between you and the EPG; 
particularly, you and the leader of the EPG, which laid the critical 
groundwork for negotiations. At the time, the EPG and those outside – 
looking back on South Africa’s actions – interpreted the bombing of the 
three capitals [i.e. Lusaka, Gaborone, and Harare, by the South African 
Defence Force] as a message from South Africa. That was not what was 
intended within South Africa, but that is how it was perceived.  
 
RB:  Yes. I cannot deny that our air attacks had a negative effect on rescuing the 
Negotiating Concept. 
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SO:  They also perceived that this meant the EPG mission was a failure – 
because you did not have the meeting between the EPG and the 
Constitutional Committee, which was scheduled for that day [19th May 
1986], and they felt that the immediate withdrawal of the EPG 
contributed to their pressure on the SAG. That is the perception from 
outside. But you are saying that, in actual fact, the dynamic of what was 
going on inside the country was fundamentally different. 
 
RB:  Yes. One point which I cannot contradict is the negative effect of bombing the 
three capitals of Commonwealth countries. It was clear to me that the EPG 
had lost faith in any successful outcome. 
 
SO:  Did Obasanjo feel that his personal negotiations with you had also 
failed? 
 
RB:  No. We both felt that events took place in which we had no hand. I wrote 
letters to try to revive negotiations. Our friendship continued.  
 
When PW Botha resigned, De Klerk became president. He became president 
immediately on Botha’s resignation, in August 1989, after a clash with me. I 
would have taken De Klerk to Kenneth Kaunda because we had heard that 
Kaunda might take the issue of the Koevoet – which was a police unit – to the 
Security Council. And they might have asked for a ban of Koevoet, which, to 
me, was a sore point – a dangerous thing – at that stage. The elections in 
Namibia had gone a long way now, after almost a fatal start as a result of 
SWAPO transgressions over the border. I thought that, now De Klerk was 
leader of the National Party but not the President – PW remained President 
and constitutionally head of state – I wanted to go and see Kaunda and talk 
him out of it. 
 
SO:  Sir, were you also not also considering resignation when De Klerk 
became acting president? 
 
RB:  Resignation? I did consider resignation after PW Botha’s severe reprimand in 
Parliament – á propos of my statement in February 1986 that “the country 
could have a black president”. But not now. I have worked my whole life – first 
the 1960s, then the 70s, now the 80s – [and] now at last I can get rid of this 
albatross. It is a question of two-three months and then Namibia is 
independent. You can’t resign then. You have got to find a way out. PW 
Botha would not resign because he said I did not consult him in arranging this 
visit with Kaunda. I did consult him! And two of my officials were present 
when I phoned him, and they could confirm. And when I mentioned this to PW 
on the phone, he said to me, “That’s a lie.” I said, “I had two officials with me.” 
He said, “Now you are listening in!” I said, “No, we are not listening in”, which 
said to me [that] his stroke had had an effect. But, be that as it may, the next 
day a senior minister – I was the senior minister in the Cabinet according to 
the Constitution – asked for nominations for the head of state. Immediately, it 
was De Klerk. We had known this beforehand, so we had arranged for a 
senior judge to be present to swear him in. So, now we had an acting 
President until the elections – which we won. Then I walked into De Klerk’s 
office and said, “Two things are a priority: Mandela’s release and dismantling 
our nuclear weapons.” He said, “Pik, you do not have to convince me. Those 
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are my priorities also. Rest assured, we will do so. We will discuss when and 
how.” That was before the Berlin Wall. 
 
SO:  Sir, in that De Klerk had been one of your most vocal critics when you 
had said – at that press conference – about the possibility of a black 
president, how do you account for… A mere three years later …  
 
RB:  He took the quantum leap! 
 
SO:  Yes, but what do you think could have pushed or encouraged him to 
take the quantum leap? 
 
RB:  I think the beginning of the year when PW Botha wrote a letter to the caucus 
of the National Party telling them he was resigning the leadership position of 
the party, but not the Presidency; then, the caucus elected De Klerk. And his 
relationship with PW was cold, and became worse and worse. When De Klerk 
was elected, as usual – why I was nominated, I don’t know – the votes that I 
got (10-15%) went to Du Plessis. And the votes that Heunis got went to 
Barend Du Plessis. 78-72. That must have been balm in his acceptance: “if, 
after taking a quantum leap, you will find us there when you land.” Then De 
Klerk knew almost 50% of the caucus would be there already. 
 
SO:  He already had a constituency behind him? 
 
RB:  He would only need 10% of them and he would be in the majority. 
 
SO:  So, was De Klerk responding to a younger constituency – a generational 
shift within the caucus – then? 
 
RB:  I believe so. By 1989, the verligte or reformist section of the NP had grown to 
about half the caucus. It started when I was nominated for the leadership in 
1978. We were the younger generation. They urged me to stand. We knew 
that it was going to be either Connie Mulder or PW Botha who would be 
elected. We wanted to give the party a notice that we must change. “If we do 
not do it, the NP will just carry on as before.” When I consulted with Mr 
Vorster – because he was then at least in the running for the Presidency – his 
words were, “Connie Mulder, a babe in the woods; PW Botha, a bull in a 
china shop. Pik, I’m sorry I could not hang in there any longer, because I think 
you would have made it in another year. But not now. You people are too 
young.” I received 22 votes, almost 15% of the caucus and our votes then 
ensured that PW made it. 
 
So, De Klerk did exactly that. We met as a Cabinet at Nyala – a game reserve 
in the north – and it was finally decided to release Mandela. We still had to 
find a date for our first discussions. 
 
SO:  Had you met Mandela before this point? 
 
RB:  Not then. But Mandela, in his book [A Long Walk to Freedom], mentions that 
he requested the Minister of Justice to see PW Botha and me. They never 
conveyed it to me; never, never. Perhaps they decided not to inform me of 
Mandela’s request in the light of my media statement in February 1986, to the 
effect that we could one day have a Black President. 
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SO:  Do you see that as another missed opportunity? 
 
RB:  Yes. I think we could have met earlier than our first meeting in May 1990 [re: 
the historic meeting between the South African Government and the ANC in Groote 
Schuur on 2 May 1990]. To this day, I remain deeply impressed by Mandela’s 
opening address. He displayed a remarkably thorough knowledge of the history of 
the Afrikaner, referring to the pain and sorrow of the Anglo-Boer War: 34,000 women 
and children who died in concentration camps; Boer soldiers returning to graves and 
ruined farms; the ensuing poverty of the Afrikaner and his harrowing feeling of being 
wronged, humiliated and oppressed. The enormous suffering of the Afrikaner, he 
could understand. But what he could not understand, he said, was why the Afrikaner, 
when he started recovering from his devastation, why he didn’t then reach out to his 
fellow black South Africans, who were equally impoverished, degraded and 
subjected. 
 
Madiba delivered this statement without rancour or enmity. This was not a 
malicious diatribe. This came from a man who had experienced suffering in a 
prison for 27 years. He posed a question to us which has haunted me ever 
since. He led us with magnanimity through the turbulence of adapting to the 
responsibilities of a government of national unity, based on majority rule. He 
remained true to the legacy pronounced in his historic statement in Court on 
23 April 1964 when he was sentenced to life imprisonment: 
 
[Reads…] “During my lifetime I had dedicated myself to the struggle of the 
African people. I have fought against White domination and I have fought 
against Black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free 
society in which all persons lived together in harmony and with equal 
opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and achieve, but if needs 
be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.” 
 
After that meeting [on 2 May 1990], a relationship based on mutual trust and 
confidence took root and, over the ensuing years, grew into a bond of 
unconditional and intimate friendship – personal friendship.  
 
As the negotiations progressed and stumbling blocks arose, we got to know 
one another better. The first crisis occurred with the opening of Codesa. 
Mandela and De Klerk had harsh words for each other, as the direct result of 
a misunderstanding. Everybody was tense and emotional. I sought out 
Mandela after the outburst and told him that a message that De Klerk had 
sent him beforehand had not reached him. But what was done was done. 
They had to thrash things out before the following day’s proceedings, 
otherwise we would all get bogged down. He listened attentively and I could 
see he would do what he could to restore peace. I had a similar conversation 
with De Klerk and the next day they shook hands in front of hundreds of 
Codesa delegates. 
 
Apart from the multiple formal meetings, over a period of four years we met 
alone on a number of occasions – mostly at his request – to discuss sensitive 
matters. We gave each other advice over actions in order to reach a common 
goal. At one of our one-on-one meetings [after May 1990], he was deeply 
concerned about us – the NP – driving our white right-wing into a rebellion.  
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SO:  He was right, as the threat was definitely there at the time. This was not 
the stuff of imagination. 
 
RB:  Yes, the threat was there but we did not believe that a significant number of 
our white voters would have supported it. However, Mandela reprimanded us 
seriously for driving the white right-wing too far to the right. He told me one 
evening, “But have you forgotten what they did to you in Pietersburg? They 
broke up your meeting with force, and the police could not stop them.” 
Ironically, he blamed the government for pushing the far right too far to the 
right, and [suggested] that this could lead to a potentially uncontrollable 
uprising. My reaction was, “Mr President, would you prefer to negotiate rather 
with them?” His reaction was, “Pik, don’t be sarcastic. You know as well as I 
do that I reject their political programme. But you also know, as well as I do, 
that we both agree that we must not allow violence ever again to threaten our 
progress towards a prosperous democratic country.” 
 
The violence in the country – particularly KwaZulu-Natal – was one of his 
most urgent concerns. There were several crises. The Boipatong massacre 
on June 17 1992. The ANC blamed the government. I think Madiba later 
realised that the ANC overreacted. Boipatong was an act of retaliation by IFP 
members to avenge a previous attack by ANC supporters. President De Klerk 
immediately had the massacre probed by the Goldstone Commission which 
found that there was no evidence of involvement in the carnage by the 
government or senior police officials. But, in the meantime, the ANC 
announced that it had withdrawn from further negotiations until a long list of 
demands had been met. The government refused. Mass demonstrations 
followed all over the country, eventually culminating in the Bisho massacre. 
Nevertheless, we succeeded in resuming negotiations on 21 August 1992, 
which resulted in the ‘Record of Understanding’ and kick-started the 
negotiations again. 
 
We were together in Washington. I was present when he and De Klerk 
received the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo. Then, to Stockholm. In March and 
April new storms broke out. Chaos in Bophuthatswana: among other reasons, 
because President Mangope did not want to take part in the election. When 
trouble erupted in Mmabatho, Mangope called in the help of General 
Constand Viljoen, an ally at the time. He gathered his 3000 strong followers at 
the Mmabatho airport in a bid to try and restore order. But they were pre-
empted by Eugene TerreBlanche’s AWB, who exchanged fire with Mangope’s 
troops. General Viljoen did the wise thing and retreated. The government of 
Venda, meanwhile, collapsed, followed by the Ciskei. Election preparations 
could then be put in motion in those areas. General Viljoen decided to form 
his own party, the Freedom Front, and to participate in the elections. I was 
delegated on 12 March 1994 to inform President Mangope that he had lost 
his power and was no longer president of Bophuthatswana. It was a painful 
mission. But, thereafter, preparations could go ahead for the election to take 
place in Bophuthatswana as well. 
 
At this point, KwaZulu was still out of the elections. The ANC insisted that 
Buthelezi be removed as leader of the KwaZulu government and be replaced 
by an administrator. At that time, this would have had disastrous 
consequences. Talks followed with Buthelezi and King Goodwill to enlist their 
cooperation and to ensure that an election could be held in KwaZulu. Initially, 
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there was progress, but on 28 March 1994 the IFP organised a provocative 
march in Johannesburg, which ended with shootings at Shell House, the ANC 
headquarters. All hell broke loose, but De Klerk managed to arrange a 
meeting between himself, King Goodwill, Mandela and Buthelezi on 8 April 
1994. This resulted in the ANC and IFP hastily agreeing to their constitutional 
differences being negotiated by a group of international mediators. Dr Henry 
Kissinger and Lord Carrington [were] requested to come to South Africa in all 
haste to mediate. They [were], however, perplexed and powerless against the 
onslaught of arguments and counter-arguments between the ANC and IFP, 
and withdrew. 
 
Then, 11 days before the election, Professor Washington Okumu of Kenya 
suddenly appeared on the scene. To this day, I do not know how it came 
about that he landed up here, but when he came to see me I urged him to 
convince Buthelezi to take part in the election, and to do so forthwith. 
 
He was rushed to the airport where Buthelezi was catching a private plane to 
KwaZulu. When he arrived, Buthelezi had already departed. But, as luck 
would have it, Okumu still lingered at the airport for a while, because shortly 
after take-off the plane malfunctioned and the pilot was forced to turn around. 
And so Okumu was able to meet Buthelezi and persuade him to participate in 
the election. 
 
After the election, De Klerk nominated six ministers to serve in Mandela’s 
Cabinet. I was allocated the portfolio of Mineral and Energy Affairs. It was 
another Cabinet. Another atmosphere. But the cabinet functioned smoothly. 
On one occasion, about six months after the new government of National 
Unity came to power, an event occurred during a cabinet meeting which 
nearly led to a break-up of the cabinet. Mandela criticised De Klerk’s style. 
According to Mandela, De Klerk would sometimes create the impression that 
he felt superior to black people. De Klerk was highly agitated and withdrew. 
He requested the six National Party members of the Cabinet to accompany 
him. We went with him. Myself and Roelf Meyer got his permission to talk to 
Mandela. Thabo Mbeki arranged an appointment for us at Mandela’s home in 
Johannesburg. Over many years, I had learnt one important lesson: in a rash 
moment you can easily say things you do not mean. Mandela gave us a 
friendly reception. We had a frank conversation with him. I will leave the 
particulars there. The next day, peace was restored. 
 
Early in May 1996, the executive committee of the National Party endorsed 
De Klerk’s decision to withdraw from the Government of National Unity. The 
executive was divided over the matter. Myself, Roelf Meyer, Chris Fismer and 
nearly half the members were opposed to this move. But we had no choice. 
Thus my political career ended overnight. I resigned as Member of Parliament 
and subsequently also from the National Party. I have not joined any political 
party since then.  
 
I, nevertheless, still often had meetings with Mandela and conversations over 
the telephone over pertinent issues. On 1 May 1998, I underwent an 
operation to have my prostate removed due to cancer. That afternoon, after 
the operation, President Mandela visited me. When I came to my senses he 
was standing next to my bed in the ICU. He took my hand and said, “I have 
come today to say to you not to worry. You must relax. You have made it. 
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That is all that matters. I have been through the same ordeal and I survived. 
We need you. Get well and carry on.” This is how I got to know him – an 
unfathomable human being. An elder brother. A person who spent 27 years in 
prison and then handled the Presidency of the country as if he had never 
spent a single day in jail. When he said goodbye, the pain of the surgeon’s 
knife disappeared, but in my mind I couldn’t stop wrestling with remorse over 
what he had endured. [Extracts read from RF Botha, ‘Reflections on 
Mandela’, written on the occasion of Nelson Mandela’s 90th birthday, 18 July 
2008]. 
 
SO:  Sir, did the EPG or General Obasanjo play any other supporting role in 
the transition to black majority government? Did you have any more 
private contacts with General Obasanjo between 1986 and 1990?  
 
RB: We remained in contact with each other. He then became President of 
Nigeria again. 
 
SO:  How did you stay in touch? Through private letters, or more formal 
contacts? 
 
RB:  I visited him in Nigeria. I assisted certain South African companies on certain 
matters. When he came here the other day, the two of us met at the airport, 
privately, one-on-one. None of his staff present. I had no staff any more, in 
any case. What I am trying to convey to you is [that] the EPG came to South 
Africa after the awful aftermath of PW Botha’s Rubicon speech. For the first 
time in a long time an international organisation was presenting a negotiating 
concept which was largely acceptable to us but for the unfortunate 
disagreement on whether the ANC ought to agree to ‘terminate’ violence 
instead of ‘suspending’ violence.  
 
SO:   How many of your colleagues valued the EPG in the same way? Was 
there any private discussion or comment? I can quite see why members 
of your Department might have been positive, but did the De Klerks and 
Chris Heunis’ of this world see the outcome of the EPG’s mission in 
quite the same way?  
 
RB:  That’s difficult to answer. At least they agreed that we could submit the seven 
points referred to earlier to the EPG.  
 
You refer to the support I received from my Department. We were like a 
family. We were relatively isolated. Our diplomats’ children paid a heavy 
price. I knew what it was like, living as a diplomat in Sweden or abroad. It was 
not just that the outside world despised and rejected apartheid as a senseless 
policy. It was also a conviction on our part. Even if we could, for years, 
survive relying on our military strength to keep going, we would be destroying 
the country. I remember urging the white directors of companies – including 
our English-speaking ones in Johannesburg – at the time to appoint blacks in 
their board of directors. A CEO of an important company stood up and took 
offence: “It is our right to appoint who we consider suitable.” I replied, “I don’t 
want to infringe on your rights, I want to perpetuate your well-being and 
future. In our country, black and white need each other to succeed.” 
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SO:  How was the EPG’s visit presented in the South African press at the 
time? 
 
RB:  The South African media in general supported us in principle on our proposal 
that the ANC should agree to the ‘termination’ of violence, as against 
‘suspension’. And the media felt that they were correct in their opinion 
because, after we had started negotiations, a few members of the ANC came 
in and established ‘safe houses’ to store weapons and arms so that, if the 
negotiations broke down, the ANC would not be without arms to pursue 
violence. Mandela was completely unaware of this errand. Mac Maharaj was 
one of those arrested. It was big news. In other words, a section in the ANC 
also feared that the talks would break down and then the ANC would be 
without the means of violence and rebellion. 
 
SO:  Sir, why were you not involved in the negotiations to transition? 
 
RB: No, I was. But I suggest you ask Mr De Klerk what my contribution was. I also 
dealt with the complicated position of the TBVC states and the incorporation 
of Walvis Bay into Namibia. And I was often called by FW De Klerk to assist 
in finding solutions to the critical situations which threatened the continuation 
of negotiations.  
 
SO:  It is just that Magnus Malan reflected that it would have been 
enormously helpful if you had been more actively involved. 
 
RB:  The South African media wrote the same. For me, it was a huge compliment. 
Undeserved. They couldn’t understand why the man who negotiated the 
trilateral agreement with Cuba and Angola – our worst enemies – couldn’t be 
[involved with] the South African one. That would have meant that De Klerk 
would have had to appoint me as Minister of Constitutional Development. You 
can’t do that without jeopardising the country’s reaching out to the wide world: 
to convince that world that an irrevocable transformation is taking place which 
demands the rescinding of economic sanctions. 
 
SO:  It strikes me that you were still fulfilling a critical role between 1990 and 
1994. 
 
RB:  De Klerk acknowledges it. Not so much in his book, but when there was a 
media debate on this issue, he wrote a letter reprimanding the media reporter 
Leopold Scholtz, who [had] said nobody could understand why De Klerk didn’t 
use me as chief negotiator. And De Klerk came back and said that Pik Botha 
played a crucial role in assisting resolving the most critical crises. Being 
painfully aware of my own shortcomings and failures, I cannot allocate to 
myself any tributes.  
 
SO:  So what did you do? 
 
RB:  I took advantage of the transformation process. Namibia had just become 
independent, ending a 45-year-old international dispute. I wanted to expand 
my department. For the first time, [in] 1992-1993, I visited India. I visited 
Pakistan. This is when the fall of the Berlin Wall started to help us. The 
Russian bear was gone. Franz Josef Strauss played a major role. He was like 
Margaret Thatcher, who told us to dismantle apartheid and release Mandela. 
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He would come here, [and] PW Botha would receive him with open arms. But 
he would say, “Release Mandela.” When PW Botha and I went to his funeral 
in Germany, we were urged to release Mandela. PW Botha decided to send 
the South African Deputy President to Kohl without telling me; secretly, telling 
him [Kohl] that he, PW Botha, would release Mandela on parole. Kohl 
rejected PW Botha’s intention to release Mandela on parole saying the 
German Government insists on his unconditional release. Margaret Thatcher 
also insisted on Mandela’s release, but made it clear she opposed violence 
as a means of achieving a political objective. Thatcher’s view was, “Release 
him”, and at the same time, telling the ANC, “I will oppose any solution based 
on violence as a means of achieving your objective.” I used those words in 
everything I wrote. They were her words, and I made them mine. I would 
come back and say to PW Botha, “these seven points will impress Margaret.”  
 
SO:  And what was your reaction to Ronald Reagan’s predicament with 
Congress? 
 
RB:  After the triple Anti-Apartheid Act was passed by Congress, he vetoed it and 
Congress overruled it. Margaret was the last: the only one. So, I reminded her 
of the 7 points, hoping that that would persuade her to stick to her basic point 
of view. And she enabled me to persuade my colleagues to agree with this.  
 
SO:  How useful was your Embassy in London in keeping that link alive? 
 
RB:  Dr Dennis Worrall, our Ambassador in London, assisted me tremendously in 
making the EPG visit possible. He was a great supporter of the EPG. We 
were continuously engaged in telephone conversations, with me whispering 
to him things which he would whisper to Margaret or her go-between. I would 
say, “Tell the Prime Minister there will be a letter coming from PW, and she 
mustn’t get upset if there are one or two sentences which might not be clear. I 
appeal to her to react positively.” 
 
SO:  This is classic backchannel diplomacy. Feeding messages through. 
 
RB:  The issue at stake was important to me. This was the ‘breaking-through’, 
admitting the wrong of apartheid internationally. And, because we didn’t 
succeed then in 1986 in implementing the EPG’s proposal, [it] doesn’t mean 
that it died. It then meant, it is there. So, the moment we met the ANC we 
could immediately fall back onto this. This is my point, and why I’ve said how 
important this is for me in what later followed. The moment we agreed tri-
laterally with Cuba and Angola, and [the] withdrawal of troops, independence 
for Namibia, elections for Namibia…those 1st April events 1989…opened up 
everything. When Mandela was released in February 1990, we were 
immediately ready to start negotiations on the basis of the EPG concept. If we 
had… [If it was] for the first time, for the party to go into caucus to try and get 
this approved in 1990, we would have sat there for months quarrelling.  
 
When Boipatong happened in June 1992, the ANC withdrew from 
negotiations. The Security Council had a meeting on violence in South Africa; 
Mbeki and Mandela went there. I went there. It was my last Security Council 
meeting. For the first time in decades, the Security Council did not pass a 
resolution reprimanding or condemning the South Africa Government but 
[one] urging all parties to resolve their differences peacefully. For me, it was a 
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tremendous moment in my life. Then they dispatched Cyrus Vance, former 
US Secretary of State as special representative of the Secretary General of 
the UN, to visit South Africa. The first person he came to see was me. Cyrus 
and I had got along quite well during the years of the Carter regime. He 
eventually resigned because he warned Carter against sending in the military 
rescue mission to Tehran in April 1980. I was completely open with him. I told 
him about the pitfalls and problems we had to face. At that stage, it was my 
idea to agree to a general amnesty to all ANC terrorists or freedom fighters, 
all South African police and military. He then went to see Mbeki. Mbeki 
supported my proposal. I then phoned De Klerk. He said, “Pik, it is not your 
portfolio. It is Coetzee’s, the Minister of Justice.” So, I phoned Coetzee, and 
he said, “Oh no, no! There must be proper investigations on all sides, and we 
will classify the various offences according to their seriousness.” I said, “This 
is our major chance to remove at least one stumbling block from the agenda 
of our negotiations. General amnesty for all forces, but a tribunal that would 
decide on compensation for the families of the victims.” Coetzee was hesitant. 
He would need time to consider this. Thabo again – later, in New York – 
phoned me and said, “Pik, I’m getting resistance in the ANC, you’d better 
hurry up.” I again tried to push, but nothing came of it. And up to the present 
day, the chagrin of the ex-military and police personnel knows no bounds 
because of that. The TRC would have come into being, but it would have had 
a different role. The emphasis would have shifted from finding the guilty ones, 
to compensating the victims who suffered. Coetzee stood in the way. 
Mandela was his private prisoner: he wanted to take the applause and the 
credit. This is why I was never informed of Mandela’s wish to see me.  
 
So, although the EPG ‘Possible Negotiating Concept’ was not immediately 
implemented, it was indeed implemented four years later.  
 
SO:  Sir, I have a counter-factual question coming out of the conference I’ve 
just attended on the history of the South African nuclear programme. If 
the EPG had been successful in laying down the Negotiating Concept – 
if you had been able to persuade your more resistant colleagues in 
Cabinet, within the State Security Council to release Mandela, etc. – you 
would still have had the issue of the South African nuclear programme. 
Surely that would have complicated negotiations with the ANC?  
 
RB:  No, because we carried on independently from the ANC for many years as 
regards this subject. We kept the Americans at bay. They kept their pressure 
on us for years to sign the NPT. The deterrent effect, whatever it was, 
disappeared once we had signed the trilateral agreement with Cuba and 
Angola on 22nd December 1988. It paved the way for Mandela’s release. 
There was no reason any longer for harbouring the deterrent effect of nuclear 
weapons. Hence my request to De Klerk in August 1989: Mandela’s release 
and the dismantling of nuclear weapons should be our highest priority. He 
agreed, saying I need not try to convince him as he shared my views. 
 
SO:  So, as far as you were concerned, the possibility of an ANC government 
with nuclear capability was not part of your concerns, or the scenarios 
around decommissioning?  
 
RB:  Some of my officials – after a lunch with the Americans, with Cohen, Deputy 
Secretary of State for African Affairs – reported to me [that] the Americans 
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were saying, “You’d better sign the NPT now because we all know the ANC 
would come to power, and, unless you do, Gaddafi will inherit it.” Cohen 
denied that any of his officials would have made such a remark. 
 
From my point of view, I knew that the doors of the world were opening for us 
to enter, after years of being the pariah of the world. Hence my visits also to 
Pakistan, India, Iraq, Iran, Qatar, and Kuwait, all before the ANC took over. 
 
SO:  Were these visits the results of invitations to you, or the result of your 
consistent drive to open up South Africa? 
 
RB:  The moment we had made such advances – once we had started negotiating 
with the ANC – the whole world’s attitude changed. And I was welcome. I 
could make contact. I even went to China. For many years I maintained 
friendship with Houphouet Boigny of Ivory Coast, Arap Moi of Kenya, Bongo 
of Gabon, Sir Seretse Khama of Botswana, Abdou Diouf of Senegal and 
others. For years. embassies were not formally opened, but they all started to 
open interest offices with the same privileges as diplomats. We opened up 
the doors during the removal of the apartheid years.2 
 
SO:  Was India such an innovative step for you? You talk of South Africa’s 
contacts elsewhere in Africa – below official diplomatic level – but was 
there an India backdoor or backchannel during your time as Foreign 
Minister? 
 
RB:  On occasion, yes. I had already appointed a South African Indian in a very 
senior position in my department, and there were Indian businessmen with 
whom there was continuous contact. I would not like to mention names, 
because some of them are still there. If you look at the statistics today, 
whenever opinion polls are made, you will find that the whites, the Indians 
and the coloureds basically agree on all important aspects of this country. On 
the black side, the gap is narrowing. Sooner or later, a majority of South 
Africans will vote for the party whose policies stand the best chance of 
promoting the well-being of our people irrespective of the colour of your skin. 
The votes are going steadily against the ANC. It is essential that the ANC – 
as part of the apartheid legacy – should change. Then South Africa can look 
forward to a new era in which the sharing of the same values becomes the 
driving force and not membership of a race.  
 
SO:  Sir, please could I take you back to Mrs Thatcher’s visit to Windhoek, 
Namibia, in April 1989? 
 
RB:  Margaret Thatcher demonstrated that a woman could equal and exceed the 
highest qualities of leadership of any man. From 1979 to 1990, she made a 
                                                          
2
 Cf. The presentation given by Vic Zazeraj, Private Assistant to Pik Botha (1981-86) and Director of Foreign Ministry 
(1993-95), to The History of South Africa’s Nuclear Programme Conference held in Intundla, South Africa, 9-10 
December 2012: “In the first half of the 1990s, Mr Botha received literally dozens of diplomats and special envoys, 
many from countries with whom South Africa did not have formal relations. I participated in most of those meetings, 
and often received delegations in my own office when the Minister was not available. Their Governments were 
considering opening Embassies in Pretoria, and lifting all forms of punitive sanctions, on condition they could be 
persuaded that the process of change in South Africa was irreversible. Everything hung on the word ‘irreversible’. 
Our response was that, from the Government’s point of view, there was no way the process could be reversed: there 
was no Plan B, and no going back to the past from which we had just emerged. We made the point, however, that 
the National Party Government was not the only party to the negotiations, and could not speak on behalf of the ANC 
or any of the other parties. In the event, many countries proceeded with the lifting of sanctions and opening 
diplomatic missions in Pretoria well before the elections of 1994.” 
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positive contribution to stem war and devastation in Southern Africa, and [to] 
promoting peaceful negotiations. Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, South West 
Africa/Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, the Nkomati Accord, PW Botha’s visit 
to European countries, the visit to South Africa of the Eminent Persons Group 
of the Commonwealth, the Coventry Four case… She had a hand in all of 
them. 
 
She strongly condemned apartheid, but was also opposed to economic 
sanctions on the grounds that it would negatively influence the progress and 
prosperity of everyone in this country: in particular, of our Black people. She 
encouraged negotiations with the ANC and made a greater contribution to the 
release of Nelson Mandela than any other leader or organisation. Everyone in 
South Africa was on the ‘benefit end’ of her actions.  
 
In my numerous meetings with her over a period of many years, perhaps the 
most momentous one was at the Windhoek Airport on 1 April 1989. 
 
On 31 March 1989 – on the eve of the implementation of UN Security Council 
Resolution 435 and the beginning of the election in Namibia – General 
Magnus Malan and I had dinner with Louis Pienaar, the Administrator General 
of SWA/Namibia, and Martii Ahtisaari, the UN’s Special Representative. 
Having been directly involved in the intractable dispute over South West 
Africa for 26 years, this dinner was – for me – an unsurpassed historical 
occasion: deeply personal, mental and spiritual. The way could now be paved 
for the release of Nelson Mandela, saving our country from destruction by 
entering into peaceful negotiations with the ANC, with a view to a new 
constitutional democratic future for South Africa. 
 
While at the table, a senior official brought me a message that SWAPO 
fighters would slip across the border the following day in order to establish 
bases in Namibia. Under the agreements at that time, South African troops 
were confined to [the] barracks, under the supervision of UNTAG (United 
Nations Transition Assistance Group). I told Ahtisaari [that] I had received 
information that SWAPO was planning an incursion from Angola. He said it 
made no sense. From midnight, he said, the implementation of Resolution 
435 – for which we had struggled for so many years – would begin. The 
whole UN and the whole world was looking forward to it. For SWAPO to 
attempt something like this at such a critical moment would make no sense at 
all. His words were: “They can achieve nothing by doing this. As a matter of 
fact, they will cause severe damage to themselves. This would be totally 
unacceptable.” For that reason, he did not believe it could be true. 
 
I undertook to test my sources again. “I must tell you”, I warned Ahtisaari, 
“that all of us must be on the lookout and on our guard. You must admit that it 
is at least a possibility.” 
 
Hours later, the possibility became the reality. In the early morning hours of 
Saturday, 1 April, hundreds – which later grew to two thousand – SWAPO 
insurgents crossed the Namibian border, probably following the example of 
the ZAPU and ZANU invasion of Zimbabwe from Mozambique not long before 
the elections of 1980. 
 
23 
 
Margaret Thatcher was on an African tour and was scheduled to visit the 
British component of UNTAG in Namibia that afternoon. I was to meet her for 
consultations later that afternoon at the Windhoek Airport. A local farmer had 
invited me for an early lunch. From there, we would take the gravel road to 
the airport. After lunch, I went to admire the rose garden of my hostess, which 
covered almost a quarter of a hectare. I told her that, within an hour or two, I 
would be meeting Margaret Thatcher, and would she mind letting me have a 
rose or two that I could give to the British Prime Minister? My hostess 
immediately picked three or four dozen of the most beautiful roses, wrapped 
them in elegant paper, tied a ribbon around them, and added a little card on 
which I wrote a message for Mrs Thatcher. My party and I then departed for 
the airport in separate cars. The car in which my Private Secretary, Gerrit 
Pretorius, and Dieter Petzch from our Windhoek office were travelling was a 
long way behind us, and on a corner it rolled. Fortunately, they were not hurt, 
but the roses were destroyed. When they eventually caught up with us, I 
asked them to go immediately to Windhoek to buy roses. 
 
Shortly thereafter, Margaret Thatcher and Sir Denis arrived. The Iron Lady 
wore a light-checked tweed suit and a white blouse, with a large cameo 
pinned to her left shoulder. I told her news had reached me that SWAPO had 
launched a large-scale incursion – possibly thousands – across the border. 
We found ourselves in a serious crisis. Unfortunately, this was not a 1 April 
joke, but most certainly a 1 April tragedy. We would have to authorise our 
troops to move out from their barracks. But, she said, “Under no 
circumstances must you break any of the provisions internationally agreed 
upon.” I replied, “But Madam Prime Minister, can’t you consider for a moment 
the seriousness of the situation? They are coming across the border in large 
numbers! If the troops are not allowed to leave their barracks, the farmers 
south of the Ovambo might organise their own defence and we might be 
heading for an internal civil war, destroying any prospect for Resolution 435.”  
 
She was undeterred: “You will put yourself out in the cold as the violators of 
the agreement.” It could only be done with the authorisation of the Secretary 
General of the United Nations. I called Ahtisaari and said, “What I told you 
last night has now happened. Can we release our troops?” He said no, De 
Cuellar, the Secretary General, would have to approve. Mrs Thatcher was 
sitting a couple of metres from the phone and heard everything I was saying. 
She encouraged me, and gave me some helpful advice. 
 
De Cuellar said he could not give approval. Only the Security Council could 
do that. I asked him how long that would take. He said quite a while – easily 
twelve hours. I told him that we had virtually no time before we would likely 
land in a situation that would completely undo Resolution 435. De Cuellar’s 
response was that I should discuss it again with Ahtisaari. Atisaari said he 
could not budge: “I cannot take decisions which deviate from the agreed 
provisions.” 
 
I looked at Mrs Thatcher: “The dam wall is going to break. And if it breaks, it 
will be the end of Resolution 435.” She replied that I had to get permission, 
otherwise all would be lost, in any case. Call De Cuellar again, she 
suggested. 
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This time I said to De Cuellar, “Will you subsequently tell the world that I 
phoned you and asked for authorisation, but you were hesitant and declined? 
And, as a result, Resolution 435 and all the work of many years is now 
heading for a breakdown? Surely you would not want me to say this to the 
media. I assume you would not want this to happen. I am sure you will agree 
that the SWAPO invasion must be stopped. You can explain to the Security 
Council that the South African troops would return to their barracks.” My 
impression was that he did not object, and I thanked him for his approval and 
put the phone down. I said to Mrs Thatcher, “De Cuellar did not object. So, we 
are releasing our troops.” She seemed rather pleased. 
 
In the meantime my staff had returned from their rose-buying mission. In the 
whole of Windhoek, on this historic Saturday, all they could find was a couple 
of red roses. With the roses in hand, I took Mrs Thatcher by the arm and 
escorted her to her aircraft. At the steps of the plane I handed her the roses 
and kissed her on the cheek. Denis, her husband, touched my sleeve and 
jokingly remarked, “Bear in mind, she is my wife, not yours.” 
 
On 4 April, she answered a question in the British House of Commons with 
the following statement: “There has been no provision in the United Nations 
plan for SWAPO to have bases in Namibia. Indeed, SWAPO committed 
themselves to the Geneva Accord under which they are required to stay north 
of the 16th parallel in Angola. It is a breach by SWAPO which has led to the 
most regrettable fighting and loss of life. I would emphasise that the South 
African units involved are acting with the full authority of the United Nations. It 
is now important that the authority be upheld and the agreements 
implemented in full.” 
 
SO:  What was Mrs Thatcher’s particular contribution to transition from 
apartheid, and her attitude to South Africa from 1989? I do know she 
argued forcefully that Buthelezi and Inkatha should be part of the 
negotiating process. And she was also presenting to her officials ideas 
on whether South Africa should be a unitary state, or whether it should 
be a federal entity. Were you aware of these ideas? Did you argue 
backwards and forwards on this? 
 
RB:  The ANC was largely for a Soviet model: a centralised arrangement of power. 
We were never against a broadly based federal system, but Buthelezi’s 
original ideas were – as we understood it – for individual provinces which 
would have enjoyed almost independence with a very weak central 
government. Perhaps Switzerland is an example of this? We couldn’t support 
this. 
 
SO:  Were you aware of Mrs Thatcher’s views on this? 
 
RB:  We were aware. Thatcher never agreed with a federal system where the 
individual states had power bordering on independence.  
 
SO:  But she was arguing for a certain degree of devolution of power. 
 
RB:  We did so in the end. We never envisaged this would be the weak spot in the 
constitution. We got used to Mandela and Walter Sisulu’s style and values. 
We thought that the need for the large-scale training and education of our 
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Black people would have been engrained in the ANC. Unfortunately, it wasn’t. 
We would not have agreed at the time to the constitution if the ANC had told 
us that they would institute a racial quota under Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE), which benefitted a relatively small number of Blacks, 
depriving the majority of proper technical and craftsmanship training and 
education. We are still not reaching out efficiently to the poor people of this 
country. Social grants will not resolve the problem. Training and education 
will. It is not widely known that, before the end of apartheid, we had reached 
the same per capita expenditure for education for whites and blacks. We had 
in mind a massive education and training programme for blacks, knowing that 
this was the key for stability, progress and economic growth. Mandela, in his 
opening speech when we first met in May 1990, told us about our own history. 
He revealed an immensely correct knowledge of our history and the Anglo-
Boer war, expressing his sorrow at the suffering of the Afrikaners, but posed 
the question why we did not reach out to our Black compatriots when we 
succeeded to emerge from our poverty. That challenge remains. 
 
SO:  Did he refer, at the time, to the parallel suffering of Africans during the 
Anglo-Boer war?  
 
RB:  I am not sure that he mentioned it but I believe that he knows that 20,000 
blacks died in concentration camps, as well as 34,000 Afrikaner women and 
children. Mandela said, “You succeeded in emerging from your own poverty 
and deprivation, but I don’t understand, when you emerged from this and 
started to achieve, why did you not reach out to your black brothers?” We 
couldn’t answer him. That is the greatest mistake made by us. Our trauma 
suffered in the Anglo-Boer War and our wish to have our own anthem and 
flag and not to have the British monarch as our sovereign any more was so 
strong that it blinded us to the immensely sinful and reprehensible policies 
[employed] to achieve that which we wanted to achieve – and it was almost 
disastrous. It remains a haunting question, even now. Why does the 
Government not reach out properly to the poor? Why the dearth in public 
deliveries, inadequate health services and education, increase in crime and 
corruption? 
 
SO:  You conjure a powerful image of an Afrikaner sense of “our country, our 
nation, our flag”. But you had achieved this by 1961, with the creation of 
the Republic. 
 
RB:  But the ANC was almost in a state of war with us by then. The ANC had tried 
to hold meetings with Verwoerd, but Verwoerd turned them down. They then 
had the excuse that they had no other way out but to resort to violence. 
Mandela displayed extensive knowledge of our history. He had studied in 
prison, and later had been allowed to read the newspapers. So, he had read 
in the papers when I said that, someday, South Africa would have a black 
President and I would be content to serve under him. 
 
SO:  What was your view when South Africa did ask to re-join the 
Commonwealth? I know you were Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs 
by then. 
 
RB: I remember my reaction, and it is still my reaction. I do not know whether 
there is much to gain from it. But I admit the EPG played a meaningful role. I 
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would welcome a more positive role, particularly as the UNO appears now to 
be so weak. While the Cold War lasted… Yes, we nearly faced a nuclear war 
during the Cuban missile crisis, but there was a recognition and 
acknowledgement that we’d better not use nuclear arms against each other. 
So, the whole world had an unsavoury but stable international relationship. 
With the ending of the Cold War, we are now faced with regional conflicts 
which seem uncontrollable. Don’t forget about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, 
Iran, the catastrophic Iraq invasion, North Korea, the global economic 
collapse, climate change... 
 
SO:  Do you see any analogy between South Africa’s development of nuclear 
capability and what Iran is currently trying to do? That is, pushing 
forward with a nuclear energy programme – possibly more, we don’t 
know – with a dysfunctional political system, a regime which is 
increasingly isolated by the international community. 
 
RB:  The world is facing several potentially disastrous events, involving Syria, 
Afghanistan, North Korea, Iran – unpredictable – and Israel/Palestine.  
 
SO:  Surely international sanctions make them [re: North Korea and Iran] 
more unpredictable? 
 
RB: When Saddam Hussein was still there [in Iraq], Hans Blix was completing his 
report for the UNSC shortly before Secretary of State Colin Powell made his 
invasion announcement. I discussed this with Mr Mandela before it happened. 
I asked him, what did he think if Dr Waldo Stumpf – who was the head of our 
Atomic Energy Board, the man who technologically assisted in demolishing 
our nuclear weapons and enabling us to sign the NPT – and I should meet 
Saddam Hussein. I had already discussed this with Stumpf. He [Mr. Mandela] 
wanted to know how would we approach the matter with Hussein. I then 
explained to him the history of our decommissioning, and my belief that, if I 
explained we came with Mr Mandela’s support and backing, then Stumpf and 
I could tell Hussein we had been in a similar position. We would say, “We do 
not know whether you have WMD, but if you do not have it, we have experts 
who will then know how – if you will allow us – to do inspections and we will 
report to the Americans that they are making a mistake. Should you have it, 
and you have not heard our story and how this gained for us international 
applause, we have the know-how to assist in dismantling. And to dismantle in 
such a way that you will gain positive results worldwide.” Mandela 
immediately said, “Pik, please, you can tell him that I urged the two of you to 
meet with him and that I recommend that he follows South Africa’s example.” 
I then phoned the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, who said he would bring 
it to the Minister’s attention. 
 
Apparently, the Department had a meeting with Stumpf and they were 
planning to send officials to discuss the matter with Iraqi officials. When 
Saddam Hussein was ruling Iraq and you wanted to have a decision, you had 
to see him. Anybody underneath him was of little importance. Nothing came 
of it. I phoned Hans Blix – he was drafting his report – and said, please go 
ahead. You have my blessing. I had known Mr Blix since our meeting in 
February 1994, shortly before our election, when I handed him that little 
plough made from the shell casing, with those words from Isaiah, “change 
your swords into ploughshares.” 
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I don’t say that Stumpf and I would have succeeded, but with Mandela’s 
authority, I think there might have been at least a chance. I regret that the 
endeavour came to nought. 
 
SO:  Between 1990-1994, in those tough years of negotiations against the 
backdrop of violence and the need to sustain hope of a peaceful 
transition, did John Major play in any way a comparable role to Mrs 
Thatcher? Or did the Commonwealth, in any way, contribute to the 
process – through the offer of financial support, developmental funds, 
legal advice and support in constitution making? 
 
RB:  Robin Renwick, an outstanding British ambassador, played a positive role – 
no question about that. Robin Renwick was trusted by us and Mandela. At 
one of De Klerk’s functions in the Cape – before we sat down to the formal 
dinner, which I hate so much! – I pulled him aside and told him, “In your book 
[Unconventional Diplomacy in South Africa, published in 1997], you made 
some rather unflattering remarks about me!” Renwick said, “No, no, you are 
reading it wrong. You know how much I supported you, and how much you 
meant to me. Big friends!” At the time, he would come to me and say to me, “I 
want to warn you against this or that,” and, “Have you a message I can pass 
on to London?” And I would give him one. He would bring back one. I cannot 
quantify the amount of assistance he gave me, nor the volume; but the quality 
of it was good. How much it contributed, I can’t tell you. As Ambassador, he 
had a direct line to Margaret Thatcher. John Major as British Prime Minister, 
in comparison, was a vacuum. When Margaret went, it was like losing those 
horses pulling a cart. If you lose those who really pull, you are stuck.  
 
You will recall that I requested you to approach Carrington to find out whether 
he thought that Blair would receive me, to listen to my proposal for selecting a 
reliable institution like the South African Reserve Bank to act as paymaster to 
the white farmers who were being deprived of their land and, also, to obtain 
Mugabe’s blessing – creating a win-win situation for Blair, Mugabe, the 
farmers and South Africa. It was really a great disappointment. He thought 
that Blair would not even consider such a proposal. He thought, “No hope.” 
Mugabe would probably have agreed. I have met him on more than one 
occasion. When there was an invasion of Lesotho by some of their forces, 
soon after Mandela’s release, we had a crisis on our hands. I arranged for De 
Klerk, myself and Mandela to meet with Mugabe and the President of 
Botswana in Gaborone. He was like a friendly brother to us. He and Mandela 
supported our ideas on how to curb this. I didn’t want South African troops to 
be in there. The moment I suggested we could use Botswana, Zambian or 
Zimbabwean troops instead, it was, “Oh, no!” Suddenly we became the good 
fairies. After that meeting, De Klerk and I saw Mugabe alone for a lengthy 
meeting, in which we asked him to consider the release of the men who were 
found guilty of planting a bomb near an ANC office, killing a man. They were 
employed by some or other of the branches of the South African security 
forces. They got death sentences, which were later commuted to life 
sentences. Could he consider their release, now Mandela had been 
released? “Yes, yes, certainly, when Christmas comes,” [he said]. “I normally 
release a number of prisoners. They will be included.” But nothing came of it. 
After Mandela became President, I went to him and explained this to him. 
While I was still with him, he asked his secretary to put him through to 
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Mugabe: “Robert, this is Nelson Mandela, your brother.” After their 
conversation, Mandela said to me, “Pik, we must just wait for Christmas. He is 
going to release a number of prisoners and our four would be included.” 
Nothing came of this for years. Eventually, I approached the president of an 
African country, Sam Nujome, as one who still had an entrée and influence 
with Mugabe. I believe that his effort led to their release some time later on.  
 
In my career, I have learned a lot of lessons. An important one is that, if you 
could reach or discover a balance of interest between two opponents, the 
dispute could be settled peacefully. The basic requirement is that the motives 
driving your opponent must be clinically studied. With the Cubans, at our 
meeting in Cairo in June 1988, after a severe clash at the opening meeting, I 
said to Risquet, we could both be winners. At first, he thought it was a joke, 
but turned around and asked me to explain what I meant. There is still a role 
for personal negotiation. 
 
SO:  Your style of diplomacy, then, was to look for and use the edges around 
formal diplomacy: over a drink, say, “Look, we can do this”, creating 
that personal space. Geoffrey Howe, in his autobiography, talks about 
coming here to South Africa, meeting you away from your officials, over 
a drink. The space around the edges of formal meetings seems to have 
been so important. And particularly, for the Commonwealth, the policy 
‘space’ it offers.  
 
Sir, what has been your approach to life, as a politician and a diplomat?  
 
RB:  This poem by TS Eliot encapsulates it:  
 
[Reads ‘Burnt Norton’ from Four Quartets] 
 
Time present and time past 
Are both perhaps present in time future,  
And time future contained in time past. 
If all time is eternally present 
All time is unredeemable. 
What might have been is an abstraction 
Remaining a perpetual possibility 
Only in a world of speculation 
What might have been and what has been 
Point to one end, which is always present. 
 
SO:  Sir, thank you very much indeed for talking to me.  
 
 
[END OF AUDIOFILE] 
